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I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS COMMENT explores the possibility that the alliance
between two large airlines will trigger a consolidation within
the airline industry. Given the current positive financial state of
the airline industry, coupled with a lack of opportunity for siza-
ble expansion of profits, the current climate of the airline indus-
try is one that may view consolidation as possibly the only way to
expand airline profit. This Comment argues that the alliance of
two large airlines will trigger such consolidation.
It appears likely that such an alliance would create formidable
competition in an already ultra-competitive industry and that
the remaining airlines will scramble to forge their own alliances
with other airlines in order to stay viable in the new market that
would follow. This Comment demonstrates that airlines have
been preparing for such a possibility for the past few years. Air-
lines are only waiting on proposed alliances to go through
before moving to consolidation as a way of keeping themselves
economically viable with this new "mega-airline."
First, this Comment gives a brief historical overview of airline
regulation and the subsequent mergers that followed deregula-
tion. It explores the flurry of consolidation that followed the
industry's 1978 deregulation and the subsequent financial
problems that the airlines faced in the wake of those combina-
tions, as well as the relative stability that has occurred in the past
few years. Next, this Comment analyzes the current climate of
the airline industry with regard to consolidation. It argues that
the present environment of the airline industry makes consoli-
dation likely and will examine in some detail the proposed alli-
ance that may serve as the catalyst for an industry-wide
consolidation.
This Comment then explores the possible reaction that an al-
liance between two large airlines might provoke in the airline
576
AMERICAN AIRLINES-BRITISH AIRWAYS
industry. It explores the probability that other airlines may fol-
low suit by consolidating. Then, the possible impact that such a
consolidation may have on the airline industry, its employees,
and airline consumers is examined. It is possible that such an
alliance and the subsequent industry consolidation could have
both positive and negative effects on all constituencies. Finally,
this Comment concludes with an analysis and evaluation of
these effects.
II. THE HISTORY OF AIRLINE REGULATION
AND CONSOLIDATION
A. BEFORE 1978
In 1938, Congress made the airlines subject to regulation by
the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).' Congress
intended to protect the young industry from excessive competi-
tion while also maintaining a certain level of rivalry to promote
efficiency.2 Congress chose to regulate the young industry after
noting the pre-regulation rise of barons in the railroad indus-
try.' Regulation of the airline industry was designed "to avoid
the deleterious consequences of cutthroat and excessive compe-
tition, and thereby enhance economic stability, safety, and the
sound growth and development of this young industry."4
The CAB oversaw airline fares, determined route structures,
and regulated several other key industry features.5 Under the
CAB's regulation, the airline industry had a somewhat "protec-
tionist arrangement."6 The CAB disfavored the demise of a ma-
jor airline or the creation of a new airline.7 The CAB promoted
this policy by "handicapping" the competition: it expected air-
lines to use some of their profits from lucrative routes to subsi-
dize marginal routes8 while providing weaker airlines with
enough routes to keep them from failing.9 This practice proved
1 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-722 (repealed 1958).
2 See Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, The FERC's Policy on Electric Mergers: A Bit of Per-
spective, 18 ENERGY L.J. 113, 125 (1997).
3 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation Deregulation-On a Collision Course?,
13 TRA'sp. LJ. 329, 331 (1984).
4 Id. at 335.
5 See Cudahy, supra note 2, at 125.
6 Id.
7 See id.
8 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Dark Side of Deregulation: Its Impact on Small
Communities, 39 ADMIN. L. REv. 445, 457-58 (1987).
9 See To Regulate or Deregulate: An Article of Faith or Analysis?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J.
205, 206-07 (1986) (panel discussion).
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effective for promoting the policy as almost all major airlines
survived the regulation period, and no new airlines were
created. 10
B. AFTER DEREGULATION: 1978-1989
The airline industry remained under this regulatory scheme
for forty years. This changed in the late 1970s when President
Carter appointed economist Alfred Khan as Chairman of the
CAB." Kahn pushed to diminish entry barriers for new airlines
and encouraged price competition among airlines.' 2 Dissatisfac-
tion with the CAB's regulation of the airlines culminated in
1978 when Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978." The Act disbanded the CAB and gave its authority to
review airline mergers and alliances to the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT). 4 However, the DOT's authority ended on
January 1, 1989, when the airline industry, along with all other
industries, became subject to the review of the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) Antitrust Division.15
After deregulation, airline consolidation skyrocketed. During
the 1980s, the airline industry experienced massive consolida-
tion and growth. 16 In the period between 1978 and 1988 alone,
there were fifty-one airline mergers and acquisitions.' 7 Some of
these mergers were huge such as Frontier and People Express
joining Continental, Western merging into Delta, Northwest tak-
ing over Hughes Airwest and Republic, TWA acquiring Ozark,
and USAir acquiring Piedmont. 8
However, deregulation also brought financial hardship for
airlines and service problems for airline consumers. Airline ser-
10 See Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the
Tide, 14 TRANSP. LJ. 101, 134-35 (1985).
11 See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 339.
12 See id.
13 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a) (7) (1958) (repealed 1994).
14 See id.
15 See id.; see also Donald T. Bliss & Jacob M. Lewis, Overseeing Competition in the
Airline Industry: Will the Transfer to Justice Make a Difference?, 34 FED. B. NEws & J.
293, 293 (Sept. 1987) (exploring the difference in airline merger philosophy be-
tween the DOT and the DOJ).
16 See Michael B. Cox, Airline Industry Restructuring: From Stuck in the Mud to
Flying High, 16-JUN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (1997).
17 See Barry E. Hawk, Airline Deregulation After Ten Years: The Need for Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement and Intergovernmental Agreements, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 267, 276
(1989).




vice to smaller communities declined significantly as 260 cities
lost air service in the first year after deregulation and forty per-
cent of the nation's airports lost service within two years of de-
regulation. 9 In 1980, with deregulation having been in effect
for only two years, the airline industry suffered record losses of
$280 million. 20 By 1982, worldwide airline industry losses were
$900 million despite the additional seven million passengers it
had acquired since 1981.21
Despite this negative financial climate, many airlines consum-
mated mergers during the decade following deregulation. Sev-
eral of these airlines later found this strategy to be an unwise
choice. Many of the acquiring airlines were soon "hobbled with
excessive debt that became more crushing when the economy
soured, or found it a nightmare trying to merge the different
airlines' labor contracts and employee work rules."22 For exam-
ple, Pan American World Airways struggled for several years af-
ter its 1979 acquisition of National Airlines.23 Northwest
Airlines suffered the same dilemma after buying Republic in
1986.24 Texas Air Corp. eventually collapsed after merging East-
ern, People Express, and Continental.25 USAir is one of the few
merged airlines that has survived into the present, but it is
plagued with high operating costs and is considered among the
weakest of the large carriers.26 Regardless of these failures, air-
line mergers continued to flourish throughout the 1980s.
C. THE 1990S
The expansion trend prevalent throughout the 1980s saw the
beginning of its demise on August 2, 1990. Following Iraq's in-
vasion of Kuwait, fuel prices jumped from an average fifty-five
cents per gallon to more than one dollar per gallon.27 Within
months of this "watershed date," Continental, Pan Am, America
West, Midway, and several smaller airlines filed for bankruptcy.2
19 See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 359; see also Dempsey, supra note 8, at 455.
20 See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 342.
21 See id.
22 James F. Peltz, Airline Mergers '90s-Style Might Stand a Better Chance This Time,





27 See Cox, supra note 16.
28 See id.
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In addition, Pan Am, Midway, and Eastern Airlines ultimately
liquidated their assets. 29
Since this earlier part of the decade, however, the airline in-
dustry has enjoyed a period of relative calm. When comparing
the airline industry of the 1990s with that of the 1980s, the 1990s
have been relatively stable in terms of airline mergers and acqui-
sitions." There have not been the large mergers and subse-
quent bankruptcies that characterized the 1980s for several
years. " In fact, the main airline event over the past few years
has been the continued battle between larger, established carri-
ers and low cost, low-fare start up carriers.3 2 While there have
been a handful of merger proposals and discussions in the past
few years, they have typically been with the smaller, low-fare car-
riers and have not had a large effect on the industry. Recent
examples include 1997's Valuejet-AirWays merger and the West-
ern Pacific-Frontier merger: 3
In 1995 this stability appeared to be in danger when USAir
initiated talks with United Airlines and American Airlines.34
Those talks eventually broke down due to USAir's high labor
costs. 35 However, the possibility of a USAir alliance was enough
to rekindle the airline industry's attention on consolidation. 6
This attention to the possibility of industry-wide consolidation is
now prevalent.
III. THE PRESENT PRO-CONSOLIDATION
ENVIRONMENT
The current climate of the airline industry is conducive to
consolidation in the near future. Every airline appears to be
preparing itself for the next big airline alliance. As one airline
analyst has noted, even if most airline executives are not eager
to consolidate, they do not want to be unprepared if their com-
petitors start allying themselves: "I think the flurry of talks
29 See id.
30 See Richard Tomkins, US Airlines Locked on to a Consolidation Flight-Path, FIN.
TIME S, Dec. 6, 1996, at 29, available in 1996 WL 13953591.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Steve Huettel, Valujet Targets New Image, Routes With AirTran Merger,
TAMPA TRIBUNE, July 11, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 10796840; see also Penny
Parker, Low-fare Air Merger Takes Flight WestPac and Frontier Forming New Company,
DENY. PosT, July 1, 1997, at A01, available in 1997 WL 6078147.





around USAir . . . caused all of the companies to look at that
[merger] possibility and think of the various scenarios that may
unfold .... They may have various contingency plans in their
vaults. It is a topic that is waiting on the back burner. 37
A. THE CURRENT PRO-CONSOLIDATION CLIMATE
In 1996, the airlines generated record profits while also en-
joying strong stock prices.3 Despite such profits, growth pros-
pects for airlines are few as the industry has matured. Many
analysts consider airline consolidation to be the "natural next
step" as it has been in the defense, railroad, and trucking indus-
tries.39 Airlines have tried improving their growth by adding
more hubs to their networks and adding international alliances,
but they are only enjoying around three percent annual domes-
tic growth.40 This and the over-capacity and huge losses of the
early 1990s seems to have taught the airlines that expanding ca-
pacity will not allow them to grow domestically.4 The new phi-
losophy is that the economy can only support the approximately
4000 airplanes already being utilized, and the only way to in-
crease ridership is by reducing fares and enduring losses.42
Thus, the new airline thinking may be that it is "[b] etter to buy a
competitor than [it is] to bury one by adding airplanes, cutting
fares and stealing passengers."4 3 Some believe that "[t]he the-
ory that it is cheaper and easier to do the growth internally is
now seen as a fallacy."44
Therefore, airline consolidation may be viewed by many as
the only way to increase an airline's growth. The acceptance of
37 Top 1997 Issues are Earnings, Alliances, Safety and FAA Funding, AIRLINE FIN.
NEWS, Jan. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7878983 (quoting Phil Bagley, a debt
analyst with Standard & Poor) [hereinafter Top 1997 Issues]. A more recent as-
sessment has stated that "[a] irline alliances are all the rage." Michael Miller, The
Last Word: Airlines Jump on the Alliance Bandwagon, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Nov. 9,
1998, available in 1998 WL 7198091 (reporting a June 1998 survey that these are
502 non-regional airline alliances worldwide, a 38 percent increase from 1997).
38 See Scott McCartney & Martha Brannigan, High Anxiety: Behind Talks of Delta,
Continental Are Fears of Being Left Behind, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1996, at Al, available
in 1996 WL-WSJ 11808502.
39 See Behind Delta-2-: A New Round of "Monopoly "?, DOWJONES NEWS SERV. (Dec.
4, 1996) [hereinafter Behind Delta].
40 See id
41 See Scott McCartney, Consolidation May Be Only Way for Airlines to Grow, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 20, 1995, at B5, available in 1995 WL-WSJ 9908696.
42 See id,
43 Id.
44 Id. (quoting Thomas Longman, a Lehman Brothers analyst).
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consolidation as a viable option for the airline industry has been
offered by analysts for at least a couple of years now. As one
analyst stated in 1996, "[a]s the industry matures, consolidation
is the way to eke out the last bit of growth .... It's looming out
there, especially when you have a catalyst."45 The rationale be-
hind this theory is that as industries consolidate, their profit
margins will stabilize or rise, and the stock's price-earnings mul-
tiples will also rise. 6 In 1995, another industry analyst was
quoted as labeling consolidation as "the only way to go" for air-
lines in 1996 and noted that the problem major airlines would
face in 1996 would be what "to do for an encore after one of the
most stunning turnarounds in the history of the business. '""v A
more recent assessment predicts that "the next three years are
likely to be quite interesting as airlines take advantage of ex-
isting alliances to go to the next step and merge. '"48
Some airline executives appear to be in agreement with this
assessment. John Harper, USAir's chief financial officer, pre-
dicted in late 1995 that there would soon be "another consolida-
tion phase in this industry. You can't have us middle-tier
carriers on a long-term basis."4 Another airline executive stated
support for industry consolidation: "I've always seen a reason for
consolidation. And I don't think it's too soon."5 "
Thus, since at least 1995 there seems to be a general attitude
in the airline industry that consolidation is inevitable. The cur-
rent economic climate of the airline industry seems to continue
to support this attitude that the airline industry is ripe for
consolidation.
1. The Economic Climate
The airline industry is still a mature industry with robust earn-
ings and excess cash, but with few opportunities for internal in-
vestment.5" There is still over-capacity in the industry and thus
45 Behind Delta, supra note 39 (quoting Kevin Murphy, a Morgan Stanley
analyst).
46 See id.
47 McCartney, supra note 38 (quoting Thomas Longman, a Lehman Brothers
analyst).
48 Open Skies Will Be Needed to Allow Wave of Mergers, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Mar. 31,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7879087 [hereinafter Open Skies].
49 McCartney, supra note 41.




"consolidation talks may accelerate now, not decelerate ... [as
these] are ideal conditions for these types of deals. 52
It also appears that the current economic environment of the
airline industry provides airline consolidation with a greater
chance of success than past attempts. Most major airlines today
operate with lower costs than they did in the 1980s. 51 In addi-
tion, airlines have been enjoying a healthy economy and strong
passenger traffic which have produced enormous profits.54 It
also appears that airlines are "wisely using their current, swollen
earnings to pay down their debts and have only cautiously or-
dered new aircraft so as not to fly too many empty, expensive
seats" and have "for now, laid off their old habit of constantly
slashing fares, a tactic that protected their market shares but
wreaked havoc with their profits and helped saddle them with
more than $10 billion of losses between 1990 and 1994." 5
2. Non-Economic Reasons
There also appear to be non-economic reasons for believing
that airline consolidations will be more successful now than in
the past (and, thus, more likely to happen). The negative ex-
periences that many airlines endured in the past may have
taught airline executives what to avoid. As one industry analyst
has stated, "There's a greater chance. . [of success] if only be-
cause everyone knows what flops the previous mergers had
been. '56 Another non-economic element may have changed
which could improve merger success - the egos of airline execu-
tives.57 In the past, airline executives seemed to thrive on mak-
ing their airline the biggest regardless of cost, assuming that size
would enable their airline to push out smaller airlines .5  Today,
airline executives appear more concerned with a profit.59 Conti-
nental Chairman Gordon Bethune has supported this theory
pointing out that "what counts today in the airline business is
not size, but making money."60 Many believe that with the cur-
52 Id. (quoting Vivian Lee, an analyst with BT Securities, a unit of Bankers
Trust).
53 See Peltz, supra note 22.
54 See id. (predicting combined airline profits to hit a record $2.5 billion or
more for 1996).
55 Id.
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rent financial state of the airline industry, the best way of mak-
ing money would be further consolidation through mergers of
major airlines.6 With major airlines putting global networks in
place in order to compete on a worldwide basis, which would
mean greater profits, "stronger market strength on the home-
front... would only cement in place a truly global network."6 2
3. The Alternate Catalyst: Stock Prices
Before continuing, there is one consolidation catalyst that
should at least be briefly considered. While this Comment fo-
cuses primarily on the possibility of airline consolidation follow-
ing the alliance of two large airlines, outside economic forces
could effectuate the same result. At least one analyst has specu-
lated that a significant drop in stock prices could spark airline
consolidation.63 These reduced stock prices would lower the
cost of acquiring an airline. 64 This possibility is unattractive to
smaller airlines that might not be desirable enough to attract an
acquirer, making some of then unable to survive such a scena-
rio. 65 However, as likely as this scenario may be, it appears even
more likely that an alliance of two large carriers will be the im-
petus that drives other airlines to consolidate. Therefore, the
alliance that appears most likely to trigger such an airline indus-
try consolidation will now be examined.
B. THE PROBABLE CONSOLIDATION CATALYST: THE PROPOSED
AMERICAN AIRLINES-BRITISH AIRWAYS ALLIANCE
This Comment will now analyze the recent merger possibility
that has drawn the greatest speculation as being the final impe-
tus for industry-wide consolidation. As has been previously as-
serted, if airline consolidation does occur, it will likely be
sparked by the alliance of two large airlines. The ongoing pro-
posed alliance between American Airlines and British Airways
has continually been identified as the most likely candidate for
this catalyst. Their talks have already made other airlines con-
sider the possibility of consolidation. For example, Gordon Be-
thune, Continental's CEO, told employees after the
61 See Future of Airline Mergers May Extend to U.S. Major Carriers, WORLD AIRLINE
NEWS, June 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8541724 [hereinafter Future].
62 Id. (quoting Susan Donofrio, an analyst with NatWest Securities).
63 See Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37 (quoting Dave Trietal, president of the





announcement of the British Airways-American Airlines talks
that such an alliance could lead to industry consolidation.66
The reason for this reactionary response is a matter of staying
competitive. An alliance between two large airlines, both of
which provide substantial competition to other airlines, would
create an even larger competing entity. Many airlines might feel
that they would have no choice but to ally themselves in order to
survive the heightened competition following such an alliance.
This could have a domino effect, forcing other airlines to com-
bine in order to keep up with the other newly-consolidated
airlines.
Thus, it is understandable that many airlines (and the airline
industry in general) are in the consolidation mindset. It would
simply not be sound business judgment to ignore exploring re-
sponses to a consolidation scenario given the current forecast
that consolidation is probable. Therefore, it is not only under-
standable but necessary for airline executives to examine poten-
tial buyers or sellers of their airlines in order to be prepared if a
large alliance does occur. They would then be in a position
where their planning may help keep their airline competitive
(or even solvent). Indeed, many airline officials are already
planning alliances with other airlines in order to compete
against these proposed alliances. 67 Many airline industry ana-
lysts are in agreement that an alliance between two larger air-
lines will cause other airlines to attempt to merge.68
1. The Proposed Alliance
On June 11, 1996, former rivals American Airlines and British
Airways announced their plans for a proposed alliance between
the two airline giants.69 The proposed alliance remains uncom-
pleted. However, it is likely that this alliance, if successful, will
be the final catalyst that drives the airline industry to
consolidate.
The alliance, as originally proposed, would have involved
both airlines pooling costs and revenues, planning strategies




69 See AMR Corp. Communications, American Sees Progress by Regulators in British
Airways Alliance Review (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.amrcorp.com /amr/
sep0897b.htm> (AMR Corp.'s official website for American Airlines. AMR Corp.
is American Airlines' parent company) [hereinafter AMR Corp., Progress].
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other, and possibly swapping equity stakes of up to twenty per-
cent. 0 American Airlines stated that the original alliance pro-
posal had three main elements:
1. Coordination of all passenger and cargo services that the two
carriers operate between the United States and Europe, with
profit sharing on Alliance services.
2. Codesharing across each other's global networks; wherever
possible, American will place its "AA" designator code on British
Airways' transatlantic services and flights beyond BA's European
gateways, and British Airways will place its "BA" code on Ameri-
can's transatlantic services and flights beyond American's U.S.
gateways.
3. Establishment of a fully reciprocal, worldwide frequent flyer
program. 7
1
It appears that the impetus behind the AA-BA alliance is the
recognition of the need to stay competitive in an increasingly
global market. At least from American Airline's view, it is this
same recognition that sparked the other major global airline al-
liances of recent years such as the Luftansa-United-SAS, KLM-
Northwest, and Delta-Sabena-Swissair-Austrian alliances. 72 Ac-
cording to American Airlines:
The airline industry is a network business. In the past, carriers
built linear route systems, and were content to transfer passen-
gers to another airline to get them to their destinations. Follow-
70 See British Airways, AMR Mull Possible Alliance, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, June 3,
1996, available in 1996 WL 288746 [hereinafter BA, AMR Mull]. However, this
more ambitious alliance has been put on hold. Due to the continuing regulatory
hurdles discussed later, both airlines have offered to phase the alliance in over
four to five years if that timetable would make it more acceptable to regulators.
See Terry Maxon, British Air, American Redo Alliance Plans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 31, 1998, at IF, available in 1998 WL 13114964; see also infra notes 75-82 and
89-95 and accompanying text (discussing specific regulatory hurdles that pro-
voked the announcement of a scaled back alliance). The airlines now plan to
codeshare in the U.S. domestic and European Union markets (which is argued as
allowable under the existing Bermuda II bilateral) but delay other co-operation
such as price coordination, revenue sharing, capacity, and schedule planning un-
til regulatory approval is granted. See Tom Gill, BA/American Put Alliance Brakes
On, AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11817520. In addition, fall-
ing yields of 4.3% on first class and business passengers were cited as a further
reason for postponement of the original alliance plan. See id.
71 AMR Corp. Communications, The American Airlines-British Airways Alliance
Will Benefit Consumers and Enhance Competition (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://
www.amrcorp.com/amr/octl496a.htm> [hereinafter AMR Corp., Benefit].
72 See id; see also Rivals Attack British-American Airline Deal: Lines Fear Price Goug-
ing by Alliance, COURIERJ. (Louisville, Ky.),June 12, 1996, at 8B, available in 1996
WL 6350078 [hereinafter Rivals].
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ing deregulation of the domestic U.S. airline industry in 1978,
airlines abandoned linear route systems in favor of hub-and-
spoke networks, which greatly increased efficiency and geograph-
ical scope. In the past few years, this process has begun to take
root in international aviation. International air carriers now rec-
ognize that global hubs are an effective way to keep customers on
their network or that of a partner, and that hub-and-spoke net-
works provide more choice and convenience to passengers and
shippers, and more benefit to the airline.73
2. Obstacles to the Alliance
Perhaps because of the widespread consequences involved
with this alliance, it has been examined carefully by all involved
and, as discussed previously, several factors have caused its full
implementation to continue to be delayed. Regulatory consid-
erations by both the United States and British governments have
halted the completion of the alliance. However, it is believed
that the U.S. and U.K. governments will eventually approve the
alliance. 74 In addition, resistance by rival airlines arguing poten-
tial antitrust violations and other factors have caused the alli-
ance to continue to languish as a proposal.
a. The Passage of an "Open Skies" Pact
One of the major hurdles facing the AA-BA alliance is the pas-
sage of an open skies pact between the United States and Brit-
ain. The U.S. government has declared that it will not approve
the alliance unless Britain agrees to an open skies pact. The
United States has similar agreements with a dozen countries, in-
cluding Germany, as well as "liberalized" air transportation pacts
with nearly thirty other countries.7 5 Bill Schulz, a spokesman for
the DOT indicated that this policy was intended "to ease restric-
tions on rival carriers, which could be crippled by such a trans-
portation titan. ' 76  According to Mr. Schulz, the U.S.
government has "made it clear to the British that an open-skies
agreement ensuring free competition would be a prerequisite
for consideration of antitrust immunity for such an alliance."77
An open skies treaty would provide British and U.S. air carriers
73 AMR Corp., Benefit, supra note 71.
74 See Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37.
75 See Laura Myers, 2 Airlines Seek Permission For Alliance, DEN. POST, Jan. 11,
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unrestricted access to airport hubs.7" Both airlines have stated
that they agree with such a policy, advocating that their pro-
posed alliance promotes open competition, and lower ticket
prices. 9
The regulatory hurdle has been a continuing impediment to
the proposed alliance. Both airlines originally projected that
they would be granted regulatory clearance by November of
1996.0 However, this goal was not met. Indeed, almost a year
later, with the open skies agreement still not having been com-
pleted, U.S. Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater projected
that the agreement would be sealed by the end of 1997.81 How-
ever, even at the time of Secretary Slater's comments, there were
still no set dates for a resumption of aviation talks with Britain.
In addition, the DOT announced plans to hold hearings on the
pact that would follow a two-month comment period, making it
unlikely to obtain approval by the end of 1997. Secretary Slater,
perhaps acknowledging the considerable time delays that the
pact's passage had already caused stated further, "I know it's op-
timistic but I think we can get closure by the end of the year. '8 2
This assessment was indeed optimistic as the U.S. and U.K. gov-
ernments have still not solidified the open skies agreement and
it does not appear that they will any time in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Thus, if for no other reasons, the original American Air-
lines-British Airways alliance may not be successful because of
the enormous difficulties involved in getting one government
(let alone two) to finally agree on the open skies agreement.
b. Antitrust Concerns
Closely tied to the issue of an open skies agreement is the
argument raised by rival airlines that the American Airlines-Brit-
ish Airways alliance would stifle competition from other airlines.
Presently, American Airlines and British Airways carry around
78 See BA, AMR Mull, supra note 70.
711 See Myers, supra note 75.
80 See CNN Travel News, Months Late and No Signs of Progress for British Airways-
American Deal, Aug. 20, 1997 (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://cnn.com/ TRAVEL/
NEWS/9708/20/air.alliance.ap/>.
81 See CNN Travel News, U.S. Transportation Secretary Says Open Skies Deal Coming
Soon, Sept. 8, 1997 (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://cnn.com/TRAVEL /NEWS/
9709/08/air.update.reut/>.
812 Id. Over a year after this comment, U.S. negotiators prematurely ended talks
with British officials stating Britain "was not prepared to resolve any of the core
issues," and a few days later, the U.S. Department of Transportation postponed
hearings on the alliance indefinitely. See Terry Maxon, supra note 70.
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sixty percent of the airline traffic between the United States and
Britain. 3 If the alliance is approved, they would no longer com-
pete against one another. Many airlines have warned that the
alliance would become nothing more than a "massive transatlan-
tic price-gouging cartel" since they would control sixty percent
of the U.S.-U.K. market. 84 Continental president and CEO,
Gordon Bethune has argued that "[t] he two largest trans-Atlan-
tic carriers should not be allowed to combine their operations
without requiring a substantial divestiture of assets to assure gen-
uine competition."8 5 One of the more scathing criticisms came
from Virgin Atlantic Airways (British Airways' arch rival) chief
Richard Branson, who accused American Airlines and British
Airways of setting "a new world's record for chutzpah by propos-
ing what has come to be called the 'merger from hell."'8 6 Amer-
ican Airlines has dismissed the claims that the alliance would
hamper competition or fix prices. According to Donald Carty,
American's president, "'If someone comes in and lowers prices
and we don't respond, we won't have 60 percent' of the traffic
between the United States and Britain. 8 7 Likewise, British Air-
ways CEO Bob Ayling has responded that the alliance would in-
crease competition and lower fares.88
c. Heathrow Airport and the European Commission
One of the crucial elements connected with the proposed alli-
ance is airline access to the coveted takeoff and landing slots at
London's Heathrow airport. Britain presently only allows two
U.S. airlines, American and United, to fly into Heathrow.89 The
U.S. government has insisted that Heathrow be opened to other
airlines before approving the British Airways-American Airlines
83 See Rivals, supra note 72.
84 Dirk Beveridge, Plan By United Rivals Still In Holding Pattern, DENV. POST,
Aug. 20, 1997, at C03, available in 1997 WL 6082631.
85 Rivals, supra note 72. TWA Chairman Gerald Gitner sent a letter to Presi-
dent Clinton stating trans-Atlantic alliances such as the American Airlines-British
Airways alliance hamper his company's ability to compete fairly and that exempt-
ing such alliances from antitrust regulation would allow such carriers "to fix
prices and travel agent commissions as well as divert traffic from competing carri-
ers." Kyung M. Sony, Airline Alliances are Unfair to Competitors, TWA Chairman Says,
KNIGHT-RIDDER TmiB. Bus. NEWS. Dec. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16352859.
86 Beveridge, supra note 84.
87 Rivals, supra note 72.
88 See id.
89 See Beveridge, supra note 84.
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alliance."' The aforementioned open skies agreement would al-
low other U.S. airlines such as Delta, Northwest, Continental
and TWA to also provide service to Heathrow." American Air-
lines has claimed that the alliance would result in more competi-
tion by giving more airlines access to HeathrowY2
In addition to the necessity of satisfying the United States and
British governments, the proposed alliance also has to meet with
the approval of the European Commission (EC). The EC has
long stated that it will block the alliance if the airlines do not
make concessions on slots at Heathrow." As a commission
spokesman has warned, "If they don't give any commitments on
slots, there should be no surprise that we could not accept such
an alliance."" The EC informed American Airlines and British
Airways in July of 1997 that they would have to make room for
other airlines by giving up 350 slots, most at the congested
Heathrow airport.1
5
d. Rival Airlines' Concerns and American's Response
Despite assurances to make slots available and the claims of
American Airlines and British Airways, numerous airlines and
other organizations have taken a skeptical view of the proposed
alliance. The United States Senate has held hearings on the
9o See id.
91 See Rivals, supra note 72.
92 See AMR Corp., Progress, supra note 69 (quoting Arnold Grossman, American
Airlines' Vice President of International Affairs). There may be some merit to
this argument. Some analysts have speculated that the only way London airports
will be opened up for other airlines is if the alliance goes forward. See, e.g., Terry
Maxon, Airline Alliance Progresses: European Regulators Outline Restrictions on British
Airways-American Proposal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 9, 1998, at ID, available in
1998 WL 13086433 (quoting Sam Buttrick, an analyst with Paine Webber Inc.).
93 See Amelia Torres, EU Reiterates Hurdle to BA, AA Airlines Deal (visited Nov. 7,
1997) <http://www.infoseek.com/Content?arn=A1608... oframes&col
-NX&svx=LHsnx&ak=NEwsl486&kt=A> (Infoseek: The News Channel webpage
reporting a Nov. 5, 1997 Reuters news service story).
94 Id. For an in-depth analysis of the EC's review of the alliance, see G. Porter
Elliot, Learning to Fly: The European Commission Enters Unfamiliar Skies in its Review of
the British Airways-American Airlines Alliance, 64J. AIR L. & COM. 157 (1998).
95 See Torres, supra note 93. One year later, this was revised to 267 specific
slots. See also Michael Skapinker & Samer Iskandar, EU Riders to BA-American Pact
Approval, FIN. TIMES, July 31, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 12255915. This
obstacle has proven to be a formidable one as it caused British Airways to forgo
immediate approval and instead settle for a scaled back plan of alliance. See Lau-
rence Zuckerman, British Airways Seeking Phased-in Link With American, N.Y. TIMES-




proposed alliance.96 Senator Mike Dewine (R-OH), Chairman
of the Senate Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Sub-
committee, which held one such hearing on the American-Brit-
ish Airways alliance, stated:
Competition is essential to cost and convenience for the airline
travelers .... As global transportation expand in the next cen-
tury, it is important that the marketplace provide all consumers
with competitive prices, quality services, and a variety of travel
options. Those of us on Capital [sic] Hill want to be certain that
the impact of this proposed alliance on competition, air fares for
consumers, and the viability of the industry is fully examined.97
At the hearing, Barry Simon, Senior Vice President, Interna-
tional of Continental Airlines gave lengthy testimony voicing
many airlines' trepidations of the American Airlines-British Air-
ways alliance.98
American Airlines, in an official release, responded to what it
saw as the three principal arguments being made by most oppo-
nents of the alliance: (1) the alliance would be too large, (2) the
alliance would dominate U.S.-U.K. air travel and would increase
prices, and (3) even with an open skies agreement, genuine
competition would be impossible because of the slot and facility
constraints at London's Heathrow Airport.99 American Airlines
responded to each argument in turn. It argued that the Ameri-
can Airlines-British Airways alliance would actually be smaller
than two existing alliances: the Lufthansa-United-SAS alliance
and the KLM-Northwest Alliance.1"' Next, American disputed
the claim that the proposed alliance would dominate the U.S.-
96 See Mike Dewine, Dewine Calls For Hearings on Proposed Airline Merger, Gov'T
PREss RELEASES, Apr. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4431612.
97 Id.
98 See The Antirust Implications of the Prposed British Airways-American Airlines Alli-
ance Before the Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1997) (statement of Barry P. Simon, Senior
Vice President, International for Continental Airlines), available in 1997 WL
10569895. Mr. Simon made numerous proposals and points of criticism involv-
ing the proposed alliance. Among them were that: (1) the alliance will be able to
fix prices, divide markets, allocate capacity, etc. with complete immunity from
antitrust laws, (2) the alliance is anti-competitive, (3) the "open skies trade" pro-
posed by the airlines is not the solution to the anticompetitive effects of the alli-
ance, and (4) the Departments of Transportation and Justice must thoroughly
investigate the alliance. See id.
99 See AMR Corp., Benefit, supra note 71.
1o See id. American went on to elaborate by comparing its proposed alliance
with British Airways (BA) with that of the Lufthansa-United-SAS (LUS) alliance.
While it stipulated that the BA alliance would be approximately the same size as
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U.K. market by arguing that "[a] forthcoming study of the likely
effects of U.S.-U.K. open skies projects that after five years, the
combined share of American and British Airways in the U.S.-
London market will decline from the 61 percent under today's
restrictions, to 41 percent under open skies, a drop of 20
points."' 01 Finally, American argued that Heathrow Airport is
not "full" by pointing out that forty-five new airlines have been
able to secure slots at Heathrow since 1991 and seventy-one daily
peak-hour slots have been added at Heathrow in the four year
period between 1992 and 1996.102
e. Other Obstacles
In addition to the regulatory hurdles that American Airlines
and British Airways must overcome in the passage of an open
skies agreement and passing antitrust scrutiny, there are other
miscellaneous obstacles being placed in front of the alliance.
While some airline executives have been testifying against the
alliance or publicly condemning it, others have taken a more
aggressive approach.
Some rival airlines have attempted to obstruct the alliance by
slowing the review of the European Commission."0 Such rivals
as United Airlines and Delta have been slow in providing infor-
mation about their operations to the European Commission.0
While the airlines denied this charge, analysts have stated that
rival airlines would have much to gain by slowing approval of the
alliance as it interferes with the coordination of American Air-
LUS in terms of revenue passenger miles, it claimed the BA alliance was smaller
in other areas supplying the following measures:
MEASURF LUS AMERICAN-BA
Revenue passenger miles 160.4 billion 165.3 billion
Worldwide destinations 472 388
Jet aircraft operated 903 878
Total employees 161,000 137,000
See id.
101 Id. American argued that this forty-one percent would be "substantially
smaller than the current market shares of other transatlantic alliances at their
European gateways." Id.
102 See id.
103 See Peter Robison, Ruling on Airline's Alliance to Be Delayed, FORT WORT-I




lines' and British Airway's schedules. 1 5 As one analyst has
stated, "The longer it's delayed, the longer BA and American
Airlines lose market share to the other alliances.' '106
In a more litigious approach, USAir brought a lawsuit against
the proposed American Airlines-British Airways alliance claim-
ing that; 1) the alliance would breach a 1993 investment agree-
ment that British Airways made with USAir, 2) American
Airlines was interfering with the contract, and 3) the alliance
would violate antitrust laws.1"7 A federal judge eventually dis-
missed the interference allegation against American Airlines on
a technicality, but reserved judgment on the antitrust claims. 108
Lawsuits such as this are just one of the numerous impediments
to implementing the alliance.
IV. THE FORECAST FOR AIRLINE INDUSTRY
CONSOLIDATION AFTER THE ALLIANCE OF
TWO LARGE AIRLINES AND ITS IMPACT
This part begins with the premise that the proposed American
Airlines-British Airways alliance is successful. After years of
preparation, debate, and legislative maneuvering, the alliance
overcame seemingly insurmountable odds and is finally imple-
mented. Would other airlines begin to ally themselves with for-
mer rivals and what would be the effects? How would it impact
the other airlines that would have to compete with the new
American Airlines-British Airways giant? How would industry
consolidation affect airline employees? Finally, how would air-
line industry consolidation affect airline consumers? Each of
these questions will now be addressed in turn.
A. EFFECT ON THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Would a successful American Airlines-British Airways alliance
be the catalyst for industry consolidation? This has been de-
105 See id. Delta, United, Continental, US Airways, Transworld and Tower Air
recently urged the U.S. Transportation Department to dismiss the application
from American and British Airways. See Six U.S. Airlines Urged the U.S. Transporta-
tion Dept. to Dismiss, AVIATION WK. AND SPACE TECH., Nov. 16, 1998, at 22 available
in 1998 WL 19818960.
106 Id. (quoting Andrew Light, an analyst with Salomon Smith Barney in
London).
107 See Karen Schwartz, Judge Dismisses Part of USAir Suit Against BA-American Alli-
ance (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://sddt.com/files/librarywire /96wireheadlines/
10_96/DN96_10_25/DN96_10_25_fo.html> (SOURCE NEWS & REPORTS webpage
reporting an Oct. 25, 1996 Associated Press story).
108 See id.
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bated in industry circles since the announcement of the pro-
posed alliance. While some doubt the probability of large scale
consolidation, many airline officials have been planning to align
themselves with other carriers for years in order to prepare
themselves for the unattractive possibility of competing against
the AA-BA combination." 9 Industry analysts tend to agree with
the consolidation scenario. As one analyst said,
What is clear is that if there is one big merger, there will be sev-
eral.... The potential market and revenue power of a big route
network is considered too threatening to be ignored by the regu-
lators at the same time as the first deal. That way, the govern-
ment would have to consider the full consequences of
consolidation before giving the green light to anyone. The as-
sumption is the Department of Transportation will either accept
all the deals or none of them, but probably not pick and
choose.1 '0
Another analyst predicts that "[if] the [AA-BA] transaction
were to go through, we think it would force other carriers to
consider strategic alternatives including acquiring another air-
line.""' Yet another analyst predicts both international and do-
mestic airline mergers following an AA-BA alliance because
other airlines would be "terrified that BA and American will
work something out and have control of about one-fourth of the
world market."" 12
For all the talk and preparation of consolidation, some ana-
lysts and airline officials do not believe that a wave of mergers
would follow the alliance. United Chairman Gerald Greenwald
has stated that he does not believe one merger would necessarily
cause a "chain reaction."'" 3 One reason given for disbelieving
109 See Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37 (quoting Phil Bagley, a debt analyst with
Standard & Poor's); see also Charles Boisseau & Bill Mintz, 'Open Skies' May Propel
Mergers/Continental's Talks with Delta Timely, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 5, 1996, at 1,
available in 1996 WL 11580001 (quoting Susan Donofrio, an analyst with NatWest
Securities speculating that the rationale behind the 1996 proposed Delta-Conti-
nental alliance as "it's better to pursue a merger partner of [Continental's] own
choosing 'rather than scrambling to find their own later."').
110 Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37 (quoting Phil Bagley, a debt analyst with Stan-
dard & Poor's).
M David Field, Airline Merger Wave Shows Up On Radar, USA ToDAY, Dec. 5,
1996, at 3B, available in 1996 WL 2078473 (quoting Candace Browning, an analyst
with Merill Lynch).
112 Id. (referencing Barbara Beyer, a consultant with Avmark).
113 See Boisseau & Mintz, supra note 109.
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that airline consolidation will occur is "[t]hat there are not
enough strong companies to be acquired."'' 14
Antitrust concerns may be another reason that consolidation
might not occur. Some airline industry analysts believe that the
Clinton Administration's antitrust regulators would simply not
allow a wave of mergers that could decrease competition. 15
One analyst described this scenario when discussing the 1996
proposed Delta-Continental combination. He speculated that if
a Delta-Continental combination sparks other major airlines to
merge, then the airline industry will only be left with three or
four major carriers that would control eighty-percent of the U.S.
airline business, and "that ain't gonna fly."' 6 However, some
analysts argue that a wave of mergers could leave the airline in-
dustry with five or six major airlines (instead of nine), but this
may not be sufficient to maintain competition." 7
1. Possible Combinations
Given all of the speculation that there will be a major consoli-
dation of the airline industry, how will the airlines be affected
and who might the likely pairings involve? Numerous combina-
tions have been mentioned in response to the growing merger
speculation that has preoccupied the industry for the last few
years. Potential buyers that have been mentioned include
American Airlines, United Air Lines, and Delta. 11 Potential sell-
ers mentioned include USAir, Continental, Trans World Air-
lines, America West Airlines, and Alaska Airlines.119 It is
speculated that Northwest Airlines could go either way. 120 Some
possible combinations mentioned include American Airlines
and Northwest teaming up and United and USAir forming an
alliance. 21 A mid-1997 analysis by NatWest Securities predicted
114 Id. (quoting Michael Boyd, an aviation industry consultant).
115 See Peltz, supra note 22.
116 Id. (quotingJohn Pincavage, an analyst with the investment firm of Dillion,
Read & Co.); see also, Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37 (citing Phil Bageley, an analyst
with Standard & Poor's on the possibility of only three or four major airlines).
17 See McCartney, supra note 41 (quoting Kevin Murphy of Morgan Stanley
who points out that the air-express industry is fiercely competitive even though it
is dominated by three players).
118 See Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See McCartney & Brannigan, supra note 38 (quoting Hollis Harris, a former
Delta executive, former Continental director and retired chairman of Air
Canada).
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further industry consolidation via airline mergers with the prob-
able catalyst being the AA-BA alliance. 22 The NatWest analysts
looked at two potential merger scenarios: (1) where no restric-
tions on capacity apply and (2) where capacity is restricted to
thirty percent of the industry. 123 Each scenario was based on
five criteria - fleet commonality, complimentary route systems,
unit cost, culture, and pilot wage rate compatibility. 124 Based on
these criteria, NatWest predicted the following combinations:
Scenario one: no restrictions on capacity





Scenario two: restricts capacity to 30% of the industry




US Airways-TWA-America West 15% 125
2. Impact on Post-Consolidation Airlines
The subsequent mergers formed after an AA-BA alliance
could allow the remaining airlines to stay competitive (or at least
afloat). However, there is always a toll taken on airlines that
attempt to merge. As was discussed earlier in this Comment,
most airline mergers in the past have been disasters. 126 Besides
the financial hardships of merging airlines, there are a myriad
of other factors to be considered. Different employees with dif-
ferent wage scales and work rules must be integrated. 127 In addi-
tion, computers, routes, airplanes, and maintenance must be
meshed together. 128




126 See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.




A wave of airline mergers could effectively eliminate the
smaller airlines from competition. Some analysts speculate that
smaller, struggling airlines might not attract a larger, acquiring
airline. 29 Given the power the new alliances would have, some
of the smaller carriers might not be able to survive.1 3 0 Thus, as
larger airlines prepare for the problems associated with the post-
consolidation industry, the smaller carriers may be in store for a
fight for survival. Paul Tate, chief financial officer for smaller
carrier Reno Air has stated that he "anticipate[s] a lot of
pitched battles between large and small carriers. I expect there
will be some very difficult wars for smaller carriers." 131 However,
it might also be the case that the larger allied airlines may look
to expand more of their international routes which could make
room for smaller carriers to expand or merge domestically. 132So,
there is the possibility that consolidation could mean that "the
prospects for upstart carriers to find new niches [could] proba-
bly increase[ ].133
One positive effect that the AA-BA alliance could have for ri-
val airlines is the opportunity to obtain some of the landing slots
at Heathrow Airport that regulators have insisted be released
before the alliance would be approved. 13 4 Therefore, at least
internationally, the AA-BA alliance could open up some doors
for carriers that have been excluded from Heathrow in the past.
In addition, the combining of various airlines after the alliance
could mean fewer airlines seeking slots and, providing an oppor-
tunity for more airlines to gain access to Heathrow.
B. EFFECT OF/ON AiRLINE EMPLOYEES
Consolidation in the airline industry likely to follow an AA-BA
alliance would also have far-reaching effects on the employees of
the airlines. However, the employees could prove to be a critical
factor in determining the scope and success of post-alliance con-
solidation. This part explores the impact that airline employees
could have on the wave of mergers that might follow the AA-BA
129 See Top 1997, supra note 37.
130 See id.
131 Id.
132 See Delta-Continental May Not Fly, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-ST. Paul), Dec.
5, 1996, at ID, available in 1996 WL 6939359 [hereinafter May Not Fly]. (citing
Terry Trippler, editor and publisher of the newsletter Airfare Report).
133 McCartney, supra note 41.
134 See Top 1997 Issues, supra note 37.
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alliance as well as the impact those mergers would have on
them.
1. Impact of Airline Employees on Consolidation
One of the impediments to a successful wave of mergers fol-
lowing an AA-BA alliance would be the employees of the merg-
ing airlines. As was discussed earlier, one of the more difficult
tasks facing merging airlines is how to integrate their employees.
The problem has been stated succinctly:
Merging big airlines means melding tens of thousands of (often
unionized) pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, reservation clerks
and other workers who often have sharply different salaries, ben-
efits and ways of doing their jobs.
It's a difficult, complex task that often disrupts employee morale
and erodes the surviving airline's service and performance. Few
airlines have accomplished it successfully.1 35
Thus, airline employees can be the determining factor of an
airline merger's success. Airline mergers in the past have been
impaired by pilot union concerns about seniority rights. 13 6 For
example, strong union opposition was identified as killing the
proposed 1995 acquisition of USAir by United Airlines. 137 Po-
tential mergers following the AA-BA alliance would face similar
problems like those experienced in past acquisitions. While air-
line executives may have learned from past merger mistakes, the
employees still have the same concerns and needs as in the past.
As one analyst stated:
Yes, today's executives are different, but you're dealing with the
same airline employees, the same unions and the same clashing
cultures.
Integrating [two airlines'] labor forces is difficult, and that's why
no airline merger has ever gone smoothly .... There's no reason
to believe it can be done [now] any more smoothly than
before. 13
Another reason to believe airline mergers could be hampered
by employees is the fact that employees now carry more "clout"
in the industry and are major stockholders in several carriers. 13 9
135 Peltz, supra note 22.
1-4 See May Not Fly, supra note 132.
137 See id.
138 Pelt7, supra note 22 (quoting Raymond Neidl, an analyst with the invest-
ment firm of Furman Selz Inc.).
139 See McCartney, supra note 41. For example, a 1994 employee buyout plan
by United Air Lines allowed the pilots and machinists unions and salaried/man-
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Therefore, airline employees may have more say in potential
mergers than in the past. This could contribute to increased
difficulties in effectuating successful mergers after an AA-BA
alliance.
2. Impact of Consolidation on Airline Employees
Assuming airline consolidation is successful despite employee
resistance, how will it affect airline employees? Airline employ-
ees no longer have the equity and employee welfare-based
merger protection provisions they once enjoyed under the Civil
Aeronautics Board.14 0 Airline employees could face the prob-
lem that many entities have when they merge: how to integrate
the personnel, cultures, and policies of two different
organizations.
One particular group that could be affected by the mergers is
airline unionized pilots. Unions use seniority rankings to deter-
mine which pilots fly the popular schedules and routes.14 1
Merging the pilot lists of two airlines could push pilots (as well
as other employees) down the seniority ladder.14 2
Another problem facing employees of post-merger airlines is
the different cultures that now must be meshed together. In
some instances, the two cultures never successfully merge, leav-
ing airlines to "hold together factions as best they can like
United Nations peacekeepers." 43 There is also the possibility
that the merging of two airlines, like many mergers, could lead
to a larger number of employees than jobs.
However, it should be kept in mind that all of the negative
effects discussed here would be part of an effort by the airlines
to stay competitive. The perception of the airlines may very well
be that if they do not defend themselves via consolidation, they
may not be able to stay competitive against the giant alliances
that would form. Thus, if the airlines did not merge, their prof-
its could decrease by such a margin that layoffs would happen
agement employees to acquire 55% of the company's shares. See United Airlines:
Rying the Friendly Skies of Employee Ownership (visited Feb. 22, 1998) <http://
www.vais.net/-woa/arficles/ual.htm> (posting an abridged version of an article
originally published in the Winter 1996 issue of Working People).
140 See Gary S. Green, Labor Protective Provisions in the Airline Industry, C941 ALI-
ABA 373, 377-94 (1994) (discussing the evolution of the CAB's protection).
141 See May Not Fly, supra note 132.
142 See id. (discussing the issue of pilot seniority in the context of the proposed
Delta-Continental merger); see also Tomkins, supra note 30.
143 McCartney, supra note 41.
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anyway. Even worse (and more probable for smaller, struggling
airlines), the new combinations that would result might force
unmerged airlines into bankruptcy.
C. EFFECTS ON AIRLINE CONSUMERS
The possibility of airline consolidation could have far-reach-
ing effects on airline consumers as well. There has been much
speculation that a wave of mergers could cause airline fares to
increase and service to decline. Many airline mergers in the past
have resulted in higher prices, more restrictions, fewer flights
and general problems in service for air travelers. 44 It has been
argued that a wave of mergers could repeat these problems.
However, others have suggested that mergers do not necessarily
cause these problems and can actually benefit airline consum-
ers. 45 The potential effects mergers might have on consumers
can be broken into two main areas: price and service.
1. Price
Fares have generally risen as a result of past mergers where
the new airline dominates the market. 46 For example, when
Trans World Airlines (TWA) acquired Ozark Airlines in 1986,
nonstop round-trip fares out of TWA's St. Louis hub rose twenty-
three percent in two years. 14 7 The standard concern given when
discussing airline mergers is whether or not it will affect compe-
tition. The reason behind this concern is that many believe
mergers would mean less competition, causing higher fares. 4 "
If past individual merges have meant less competition and
higher fares, it is very possible that a whole wave of mergers that
could follow an AA-BA alliance would surely decrease competi-
tion and raise prices to some degree. In support of the proposi-
tion that decreased competition increases fares, consider a
report released by the U.S. General Accounting Office.' 49 It re-
ported that travelers at big-hub airports dominated by a few car-
riers pay "substantially" higher fares than travelers who fly to or
144 See Lisa Miller, Airline Merger Offers Fliers No Pie in the Sky, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Dec. 6, 1996, at 8, available in 1996 WL-WSJE 10755555.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id. (citing a U.S. Department of Transportation investigation).
148 See id.
149 See Ed Perkins, Mergers Will Squeeze Consumers, ORANGE COUNTY RELG. (Cal.)
Feb. 9, 1997, at D04, available in 1997 WL 7406530.
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from airports more competitive."' The report also concluded
that larger airlines have erected barriers to effective competition
at several of the nation's largest airports. 15'
However, others have argued that the merger of two large air-
lines does not necessarily mean that fares will increase.152 If one
believes this position, it might follow that multiple mergers in an
industry-wide consolidation would also not necessarily increase
fares. One reason offered for this belief is the presence of low-
fare carriers that were not as prevalent in the past. 15' Especially
in the domestic context, the presence of low-fare competition
could be the determining factor of whether newly merged air-
lines would increase their fares. As one commentator has
stated, "[i] n the long run, [the presence of low-cost carriers] will
be what determines air fares. '1 54 In addition, new "megacar-
riers" usually offer introductory bargains for weeks or even
months.1 55 For example, after TWA acquired Ozark, fares de-
creased in twenty-four of sixty-seven routes examined by the De-
partment of Transportation.1 56 Therefore, one could argue that
fares may not increase after numerous mergers and could (at
least temporarily) drop following industry consolidation.
Another potential benefit to consumers is frequent-flier miles.
Consumers who participate in frequent-flier programs can re-
ceive benefits when airlines merge because the merged carriers
usually have more destinations to offer passengers157 Thus,
consolidation could potentially cause certain airline consumers
to benefit the most from the mergers.
2. Service
In the past, airline mergers have caused increased problems
in service to airline consumers. For example, a Department of
150 See id.
151 See id. The article goes on to argue that if market concentration results in
barriers to competition as the General Accounting Office report suggests, a
merger between any two "megacarriers" would increase their ability to erect and
maintain such barriers. See id. If one believes this line of reasoning, then multi-
ple mergers involved with an industry consolidation would increase these barriers
and almost assuredly increase fares.
152 See id.
153 See May Not Fly, supra note 132 (quoting Terry Trippler, editor and pub-
lisher of the newsletter Airfare Report).
154 Id.
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Transportation survey that analyzed consumer complaints about
U.S. airlines attributed many of the problems to airline merg-
ers.'58 When Texas Air Corp. consolidated People Express with
two other carriers into Continental Airlines in 1987, consumer
complaints rose dramatically.159
Larger airline mergers have resulted in short-term impedi-
ments to service as the airlines try to work out problems with
their schedules and operations. 60 Multiple mergers between
numerous airlines could exacerbate these problems for consum-
ers as several airlines could experience these problems simulta-
neously. If, as speculated in this Comment earlier, airline
consolidation causes some smaller airlines to go out of business,
this could also cause problems in service for airline consumers.
It is possible that some routes would have less-frequent service
if smaller coast-to-coast carriers disappear following
consolidation. 161
Consolidation could also cause increased layovers and mean
new connecting flights for consumers, since merging airlines
usually eliminate redundant hub operations. 162 As one analyst
has stated, "nonstop service is reduced when hubs are
eliminated."'' 63
However, it is possible that multiple airline mergers could
benefit airline service to consumers in the long run. Many
newly merged airlines increase service in some cities.164 Also,
acquiring carriers could learn more efficient and popular ser-
vice techniques from the airlines they acquire.165 Thus, airline
consumers who may not necessarily have a choice in which air-
line they choose (certain business travelers, for example) might
benefit from new service techniques that an acquiring airline
158 See Complaints About U.S. Airlines Up Almost Seven-Fold In August, J. RECORD
(Okla. City), Sept. 5, 1987, available in 1987 WL 4325309.
159 See Miller, supra note 144. The article quotes Mike Boyd of Aviation Systems
Research Corp. as stating that "' [t] here were literally riots' at airport gates." Id.
160 See id. Illustrating this point, the article cites Steve Landes, head of the
South Florida Commuters Association, who "recalls waiting hours for a flight in
1980 because Pan Am, after buying National Airlines, had trouble determining
which plane to fly out of New York City." Id.
161 See McCartney, supra note 41.
162 See Miller, supra note 144
163 Id. (quoting Raymond E. Neidl, an analyst with Furman Selz).
164 See id.
165 See id. Speculating on the proposed Delta-Continental alliance, the article
states that Delta (whose reputation among travelers had "faltered significantly" in
past years) could learn something from the service provided by Continental
(ranked as one of the most popular and efficient airlines in the country). See id.
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might adopt following a merger with a more service-oriented
carrier.
V. CONCLUSION
In the period of time between the initial research and the fi-
nal editing of this Comment there have been no significant de-
velopments towards further implementation of the originally
proposed American-British Airways alliance. Thus, the possibil-
ity of airline consolidation after this alliance remains only specu-
lation. However, if the fully implemented AA-BA alliance is
ultimately successful, it will most likely have far-reaching impli-
cations (possibly positive and negative) for all involved in the
airline industry.
Airlines will feel the effect of the alliance as the balance of
competition shifts (by the AA-BA alliance itself and the subse-
quent consolidation it will trigger). Airline employees will also
feel ramifications through the problems faced by merging em-
ployees or the anxiety of employees of smaller airlines that
might not survive in the post-consolidation landscape. Finally,
airline consumers may face increased prices and diminished ser-
vice or, perhaps, increased benefits.
Even if the AA-BA alliance ultimately does not come to frui-
tion, the climate it and other proposed alliances have caused in
the airline industry will surely continue to permeate the indus-
try. Airlines will continue to prepare themselves for the possibil-
ity of teaming up with rival carriers to stay competitive after the
alliance of two large airlines. Thus, any future talks between car-
riers will continue to fuel the current pro-consolidation senti-
ment of the airline industry.
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